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INTRODUCTION 
A wise man once said that space exploration is a force of nature unto 
itself.1 History would probably agree. Since the beginning of our 
species’ history, people have looked up with wonder at the moon and 
the stars. Some early cultures even believed the stars to be gods or 
thought they foretold the future. Ancient Babylonian catalogs of 
constellations drew lines between stars to form pictures and stories, and 
early sailors navigated using starlight. Eventually, a Polish astronomer 
named Copernicus came up with a solar system model where the Earth 
revolved around the Sun, and the idea of space travel soon followed. 
For centuries, the idea of space travel littered the pages of science 
fiction, intrigued the scientific community, and captivated the human 
imagination. In 1957, space exploration became a reality when Yuri 
Gagarin became the first person to be sent into orbit. Space exploration 
became an issue of political superiority, and both the Soviet and the 
United States governments devoted money and resources to the 
development of national space programs. In 1969, the world watched 
as an American astronaut took a few small steps that proved mankind 
was capable of space travel, and it seemed like humankind was headed 
toward the stars. 
Today, the technology for space travel is almost ready, yet the 
progress of space exploration has been slowed to a crawl. National 
funding for space programs has dwindled, and under current 
international treaties, the development and exploration of space is 
shackled to outdated international legislation that limits the 
profitability of such endeavors. In modern times, national space 
programs cannot afford to fund missions, and private corporations—
rather than government entities—are poised to take space exploration 
to its next stage. Even now, companies are preparing to venture out into 
 
1 Neil deGrasse Tyson Quotes, BRAINYQUOTE 1, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes 
/authors/n/neil_degrasse_tyson.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2015). 
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the unknown to discover and develop space resources that have never 
been tapped. However, unless international legislation is reformed, 
these companies’ preparation is essentially an exercise in futility. 
Under current international treaties, neither government nor private 
entities can own anything in space except what they send up in the first 
place. 
New international legislation that allows for commercial claims over 
celestial bodies like asteroids is necessary to incentivize and regulate 
space exploration. Society has a strong interest in the exploration and 
development of space, especially in modern times when space and 
minerals are in short supply. In order to advance the development of 
space, the international community must change. Other scholars have 
recognized this need, and have written about possible methods for 
adjudicating outer space claims. However, the adoption of those 
proposals would come at the cost of creating a system that would lead 
to waste and the recognition of abstract claims. This Comment will 
explain how the doctrine of appropriation, a modified version of the 
rule of capture, is a reasonable doctrine to incentivize the development 
of space and benefit society in a way that would reduce waste and 
prevent the monopolization of space resources. 
I 
THE DOCTRINE OF APPROPRIATION AND ITS ROOTS IN THE 
AMERICAN WEST 
The doctrine of appropriation developed in the context of water and 
mineral rights during the rapid American expansion into what is now 
the western United States. Courts used the doctrine to grant landowners 
the right to use the water from natural streams on their newly settled 
property. Rights were granted in order of seniority. Thus, when a 
dispute arose over the rights to a natural stream, courts gave senior 
priority to the first person to have diverted water from the stream and 
apply it to some beneficial use.2  Beneficial use was defined broadly as 
“water depleted and usefully employed by the activities of man.”3 A 
senior appropriator could use as much of the water as he or she could 
put to beneficial use and could continue enlarging that share until 
another person (called a “junior appropriator”) began appropriating 
 
2 Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765, 1772 (2011). 
3 Id. 
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water from the same source.4 Junior appropriators also received rights 
in the source of water, and, under the “no-injury rule,” could even 
prevent the senior appropriator from enlarging the senior’s share to the 
junior’s detriment.5 
American courts used the doctrine of appropriation to manage the 
varied interests of different parties in the resources of the American 
West. Courts aimed for an equitable balance, whereby the first party to 
successfully make use of land was rewarded, but the party was not 
granted a monopoly on that land’s limited resources. As the Supreme 
Court of the United States stated in 1874, water claims should be 
“exercised with reference to the general condition of the country and 
the necessities of the people, and not so as to deprive a whole 
neighborhood or community of its use and vest an absolute monopoly 
in a single individual.”6 In a time when the United States was concerned 
with westward expansion, this equitable legal philosophy promoted 
discovery and development of the American West, without rewarding 
waste or abstract claims in which resources were claimed before they 
could be put to use. 
A. The Doctrine of Appropriation Developed as a Modification of 
the Rule of Capture, Which Has Its Roots in English Common Law 
The doctrine of appropriation was derived from the English common 
law rule of capture, which provided that the first person to establish the 
requisite control over a resource should be granted ownership.7 This 
doctrine was applied to resources that the courts believed to be wild 
and migratory in nature, and it relied on the philosopher John Locke’s 
theory that a person acquires rights in a thing when he mixes his labor 
with a thing.8 
The Latin maxim, Cuius est solum, eius est usque ad coelum et ad 
inferos, means “whoever owns the soil, it is theirs all the way up to the 
heavens, and down to hell.”9 Early American courts were influenced 
by this idea, and it provided the roots of early American property law. 
 
4 Id. 
5 See id. at 1777–78. 
6 Basey v. Gallagher, 87 U.S. 670, 683 (1874). 
7 See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 179 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). 
8 See Jeffrey M. Gaba, John Locke and the Meaning of the Takings Clause, 72 MO. L. 
REV. 525, 536 (2007). 
9 Samantha J. Hepburn, Ownership Models for Geological Sequestration: A Comparison 
of the Emergent Regulatory Models in Australia and the United States, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. 
NEWS & ANALYSIS 10310, 10313 (2014). 
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Under early American and English jurisprudence, the owner of the land 
was also the owner of resources connected to the land both above and 
below the soil. Despite this, courts were often reluctant to grant an 
individual absolute ownership of wild and migratory resources that 
move free and unconnected to the land.10 The rule of capture and the 
doctrine of appropriation were doctrines that sought to equitably 
mediate claims over such fugacious resources, while promoting 
society’s interest in putting such resources to use. 
Once of the earliest references to the rule of capture is found in the 
iconic case, Pierson v. Post.11 In Pierson, the plaintiff-hunter pursued 
a fox with his hounds across unowned land into a meadow where the 
defendant was also hunting.12 The chase brought the plaintiff-hunter 
and the fox near the defendant, whereupon the defendant shot and 
killed the animal and acquired its carcass before the plaintiff hunter 
could do so.13 Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Judicature of New 
York considered whether the plaintiff-hunter, by means of pursuit of 
the animal with hounds, established a right to ownership over the 
animal.14 The court concluded that he did not and found for the 
defendant-hunter.15 The court reasoned that the defendant-hunter had 
actual possession of the fox, and stated that the plaintiff-hunter would 
only have acquired rights in the animal if he had mortally wounded or 
entrapped the animal, so as to deprive the beast of its natural liberty.16 
The court’s articulation of the rule of capture in this case represents the 
rule in its traditional form. 
Since Pierson, the doctrine has been modified and applied in many 
different areas of the American legal system. For example, during the 
same period of American westward expansion, the rule was also used 
to grant property rights in gas and minerals. In Westmoreland & 
Cambria Nat. Gas Co. v. De Witt,17 for instance, the court stated that a 
landowner whose land was positioned over a gas reserve and who had 
 
10 See, e.g., R.R. Comm’n of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573, 579 
(1940). 
11 See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). 
12 Pierson, 3 Cai. 175, at 176. 
13 Id. at 177. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 178. 
17 Westmoreland & Cambria Nat. Gas Co. v. De Witt, 18 A. 724 (Pa. 1889). 
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established control of the gas had gained property rights to the gas.18 
Although the statement was made in dicta, for nearly twenty years 
following the decision, other courts applied the rule of capture 
evenhandedly to grant rights in minerals and gas to landowners who 
were able to establish control over the resource.19 To establish control 
over the natural gas under this traditional version of the rule of capture, 
an owner simply needed to bring the gas out of the reserve and above 
ground.20 
The rule of capture served to motivate expansion and development 
by rewarding individuals who made the effort to secure and control 
resources, and some American jurisdictions continue to apply the rule. 
In Texas, for example, a modified rule of capture is applied to 
adjudicate oil claims. Under Texas’s version of the rule, an owner of 
land that contains oil beneath the surface has a right to the oil, but his 
ownership is subject to his neighbor’s power to drain the oil away.21 
This “offset drilling” rule of capture serves to equitably distribute 
subsurface rights in oil, so as to maximize its use and prevent potential 
waste that would result from the granting of a monopoly to a single 
individual situated over a rich oil deposit. 
In the context of natural gas, the Texas Supreme Court has stated 
that the rule of capture prohibits claims for subterranean trespass where 
a landowner tries to bring suit against a neighbor who drains gas from 
underneath his property.22 In Coastal Oil and Gas, a company tried to 
bring suit against another company for subterranean trespass when the 
second company drilled into a gas deposit from a neighboring tract of 
land to avoid a royalty fee.23 The court did not even reach the merits of 
the case. It decided that the rule of capture prevented a claim, because 
the plaintiff company had no claim of ownership over the gas until they 
brought it to the surface to capture it.24 
This case illustrates the need for a flexible doctrine that prevents a 
landowner from having absolute dominion over resources. Had the case 
been decided under the traditional rule of appropriation, the landowner 
who lived upon the gas deposit could prevent the use of the resource, 
 
18 Id. at 725. 
19 Bruce M. Kramer & Owen L. Anderson, The Rule of Capture–An Oil and Gas 
Perspective, 35 ENVTL. L. 899, 906 (2005). 
20 Hague v. Wheeler, 27 A. 714, 720 (Pa. 1893). 
21 R.R. Comm’n of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573, 579 (1940). 
22 Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 12 n.24 (Tex. 2008). 
23 Id. at 8. 
24 Id. at 12–13. 
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despite the fact that the landowner had no control over or personal use 
for the resource. The modification to the traditional rule of 
appropriation created a more flexible doctrine that prevents the owner 
of the land above the gas deposit from having absolute dominion over 
the resource, which allows the untapped resource to be developed by 
other interested parties who are actually prepared to do so. 
Despite its continued use in some jurisdictions, there are problems 
with the application of the rule of capture in its traditional form. 
Without modification, the rule of capture does nothing to prevent waste 
and the creation of abstract claims, which is why, over time, the rule of 
capture was modified by courts and legislatures as it was applied in 
new areas of the law. Waste occurs when someone is allowed to own a 
resource that he or she cannot or will not develop, and abstract claims 
occur when someone is allowed to reserve the right to resources that he 
or she has not or cannot use. Both lead to the sequestration of resources 
beneficial for society in a way that hinders development. An 
examination of the rule’s application in the context of natural gas 
illustrates this point. 
Under the traditional application of the rule of capture, natural gas 
reserves would be the property of the landowner who captured the 
resource, regardless of the use to which he or she put it, even if such 
use would constitute waste. Such was the issue in Hague, a case 
involving three competing entities that owned land above a single gas 
deposit.25 Two of the three parties had an active market for the gas, but 
all three parties had wells that accessed the gas supply.26 One party had 
no market for the gas, and did not have a cap on the well to prevent the 
gas from escaping the ground. The two parties with a market for the 
gas sued for an injunction to stop the third party from allowing the 
precious resource to escape.27 The court declined to enforce an 
injunction and stated that the third party, by bringing the gas to the 
surface, had established control of the resource, and therefore 
ownership under the rule of capture, even if his “use” of the gas was 
foolish, or even malicious.28 As such, the plaintiff companies had no 
 
25 See generally Hague, 27 A. at 714–15. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 720. 
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standing because they did not own the gas that was being released by 
the defendant’s wells.29 
Under the rule illustrated in Hague, a landowner had the rights to the 
resources contained under his or her property, even if he or she was 
simply wasting the resource. The court also implicitly recognized that 
the landowner had a possessory interest in the resource based on the 
abstract claim that it might be of some use to him or her in the future. 
By recognizing an owner’s right to waste a resource or to lay an abstract 
claim based on some supposed use for a resource in the future, the 
courts created a chilling effect on the development of useful resources 
in a way that led to waste. 
To combat such wasteful results, some courts and legislatures began 
to address the concerns posed by the application of the traditional rule 
of capture by modifying the rule to prevent waste and the creation of 
abstract claims. The doctrine of appropriation was one of several 
modified rules derived from the rule of capture to address the concerns 
that appeared in the context of water, gas, and mineral claims. 
B. The Doctrine of Appropriation Was a Modification of the Rule of 
Capture that Sought to Equitably Distribute Ownership Rights in 
Water that Traveled Unconnected to Land, While Preventing Waste 
and Abstract Claims 
The doctrine of appropriation is a modified version of the traditional 
rule that attempts to prevent waste and abstract claims by attaching a 
beneficial use requirement to the traditional rule. While the doctrine of 
appropriation has, for the most part, seen its application in the context 
of water rights, the doctrine deals with many of the same concerns 
posed by the application of the rule of capture on mineral and oil 
claims. If the doctrine of appropriation were applied in Hague, the 
landowners with realistic markets for the natural gas would have had a 
cause of action against the wasteful third party, because they would 
have acquired rights in the gas reserve as soon as they began to put the 
gas to beneficial use. 
Like the rule of capture, the doctrine of appropriation grants rights 
in a person or entity that establishes control over a resource. Only the 
doctrine of appropriation limits the claim to what that person or entity 
can beneficially put to use.30 Further, the doctrine of appropriation 
 
29 Id. 
30 Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765, 1772 (2011). 
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limits a senior appropriator’s rights when a junior appropriator begins 
to use the same source.31 Both the senior and junior appropriator gain 
rights over the resource, and the no-injury rule prevents either from 
enlarging their respective shares at the other’s expense.32 The doctrine 
is especially important in the context of water because of its limited 
availability and commercial importance in many different locations and 
industries. 
C. Asteroids Are Similar to Water in Their Connection to Real 
Property and Their Value to Society in an Untapped Form 
Asteroids are “metallic, rocky bodies without atmospheres that orbit 
the sun and are too small to be classified as planets.”33 Like water, 
asteroids are limited resources that are unconnected to any form of real 
property. Asteroids vary greatly in size, and are believed to consist 
primarily of metals and water, sometimes in staggering quantities.34 As 
such, asteroids may contain significant resources that would help serve 
to incentivize and facilitate the exploration of space. 
Asteroids can be divided into classes, the three most commercially 
relevant being C-type, M-type, and S-type.35 C-type asteroids 
(carbonaceous) are the most common variety, and approximately half 
of the near Earth asteroids that are at least 1km large are C-type 
asteroids.36 These asteroids have a high content of water, hydrogen, and 
methane, all of which could potentially be mined to create rocket fuel 
on-site.37 Rocket fuel storage provides a limit on how far space vessels 
can be sent into deep space, so the creation of rocket fuel on asteroids 
would allow missions to probe deeper into space without having to 
bring enough fuel for a return trip. This could reduce the cost and 
difficulty of such endeavors significantly, allowing for more efficient 
exploration and development of deep space. 
 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Asteroids (From the NEAR Press Kit), NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., 
http://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/planetary/text/asteroids.txt (last visited Mar. 20, 2015). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id.; see also SHANE D. ROSS, NEAR EARTH ASTEROID MINING 8 (2001), available at 
www2.esm.vt.edu/~sdross/papers/ross-asteroid-mining-2001.pdf. 
37 Id. at 4. 
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M-type asteroids (metallic) have the high radar reflectivity 
characteristic of metals,38 and are probably the most economically 
attractive targets for mining missions because of the commercial value 
of the metals in an Earth market. S-type asteroids (stony) are rocky 
mixtures of silicates, sulphides, and metals,39 but the metals they 
contain may not be as valuable as those found in M-type asteroids, so 
they will probably not be the target of initial space mining missions. 
Recent scientific reports have suggested a single asteroid may 
contain staggering quantities of rare metals.40 One report estimated that 
a moderately sized (1 km) M-type asteroid with a fair enrichment in 
platinum group metals may contain twice the tonnage of platinum 
group metals already harvested on Earth combined with economically 
viable platinum group metal resources still in the ground.41 Put simply, 
it is believed a single asteroid could contain more platinum than has 
ever been mined or ever will be mined on Earth. While the economic 
gain from a mining mission on such an asteroid would be offset by the 
huge initial cost of reaching the asteroid and capturing the metals, this 
figure suggests mining missions to asteroids could be extremely 
profitable. Planetary Resources, a fledgling asteroid mining company, 
has already targeted a metallic asteroid for a possible future mining 
mission.42 According to Planetary Resources, this single asteroid may 
contain more platinum than has ever been mined on Earth.43 
Scientific reports have also suggested asteroids may contain large 
quantities of volatiles, such as hydrogen and methane, which could 
potentially be broken down and used to synthesize rocket fuel and 
transport spacecraft between space environments.44 Several companies 
are already researching how to successfully mine the metals contained 
in asteroids by using frozen water contained in the asteroid to produce 
rocket fuel for a return journey.45 
Asteroids are similar to water in many respects: both have economic 
and practical importance and limited availability; both exist as floating 
objects unconnected to land; and both are practically and commercially 
 
38 Id. at 8. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 6. 
41 Id. at 8. 
42 Asteroid Targets of Interest, PLANETARY RESOURCES, http://www.planetary 
resources.com/asteroids/#asteroids-targets (last visited Mar. 19, 2015). 
43 Id. 
44 ROSS, supra note 35. 
45 See Planetary Resources, supra note 42. 
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important to society and many different industries both in the context 
of space travel, and in the context of natural resource acquisition. 
However, unlike water, under the current international treaties 
regarding space, claims by either private or government entities on 
celestial objects are prohibited.46 
II 
THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL TREATIES THAT REGULATE THE 
OWNERSHIP OF ASTEROIDS FAIL TO INCENTIVIZE THE 
DEVELOPMENT AND EXPLORATION OF OUTER SPACE 
Currently, there are two outdated international treaties that attempt 
to adjudicate the use and exploration of space. The first treaty, the 
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies (1968), is an archaic but influential agreement ratified 
by nearly all of the world nations that have successfully launched a 
shuttle into space.47 The second treaty, The Agreement Governing the 
Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1979), 
was an attempt to reform some of the principles from the Outer Space 
Treaty that failed to garner popular acceptance because it was not 
signed by any nations with national space programs.48 While both 
treaties attempt to deal with many issues, including the ownership of 
celestial bodies, both fail to allow for the ownership and development 
of asteroids by government or private entities. Because they were 
written during the space race in a period of international distrust, it 
makes sense that these treaties would be concerned with tempering the 
race to establish sovereign control over celestial bodies. However, as 
space exploration shifts from being financed and controlled by national 
governments to being financed by private industry, these concerns may 
be less important.49 
 
46 See generally Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies, Dec. 5 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Moon Treaty]; United Nations 
Treaties and Principals On Outer Space, Jan. 27, 1967, UNOOSA, http://www.unoosa.org 
/pdf/publications/ST_SPACE_061Rev01E.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2015) [hereinafter 
Outer Space Treaty]. 
47 See Outer Space Treaty supra note 46. 
48 See Moon Treaty supra note 46. 
49 See generally NASA Prepares for Giant Leap into Privatized Space Travel, 
STANDARD-EXAMINER, www.standard.net/Business/2014/08/22/NASA-prepares-for-giant  
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NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration), the U.S. 
space program, was once a well-funded program. It was the focus of 
the American people in 1961 when President John F. Kennedy 
announced before a joint session of Congress the ambitious goal of 
sending a man to the moon.50 The funding for NASA has dwindled in 
modern times, and the organization now gets around 0.5% of the 
federal budget, which is the lowest it has been since Kennedy’s 1961 
speech.51 
Despite a decrease in national space program funding, corporate 
space missions are on the rise. In 2010, President Obama proposed that 
NASA exit the business of flying astronauts from Earth to low Earth 
orbit and move it to private companies.52 Several companies have 
stepped up to bat, and corporate space programs now include space 
tourism, supply missions, and in one case a one-way colonization 
mission to Mars.53 Corporate interest in space tourism and development 
demonstrates a strong private commercial interest in space as an 
industry, which could serve to finance the exploration of space in a 
period where national governments do not have an active financial 
interest in space. However, under current international treaties, the 
ownership of asteroids is prohibited, preventing corporations willing to 
invest in asteroid mining from having a secure claim. 
  
 
-leap-into-privatized-space-travel (Aug. 22, 2014) (showing an example of a space mission 
being contracted out by NASA to private-sector companies). 
50 The Decision to Go to the Moon: President John F. Kennedy’s May 25, 1961 Speech 
Before Congress, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., http://history.nasa.gov 
/moondec.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2015). 
51 See NASA Budgets: U.S. Spending on Space Travel Since 1958, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 
1, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2010/feb/01/nasa-budgets-us   -
spending-space-travel. 
52 See Private Spaceflight, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Private_spaceflight 
(last visited Mar. 20, 2015). 
53 See, e.g., Mars One Mission, MARS ONE, http://www.mars-one.com/mission (last 
visited Mar. 20, 2015). 
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A. The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and 
Other Celestial Bodies (1967) Prohibits Commercial Property 
Claims 
The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty of 1967), is currently the most 
influential source of international legislation regarding space law.54 
Ratified in 1967 by most of the U.N. nations that had successfully 
launched a shuttle into space, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 carries 
much more weight than the subsequent “Moon Treaty” of 1978. 
The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 addresses many different issues, 
including the military development of space,55 the commission of aid 
to distressed astronauts,56 international liability for damage caused by 
space objects,57 and the guaranteed cooperation between state-actors in 
space.58 While the agreement does an admirable job dealing with many 
of these issues, it fails to grant any kind of ownership claims over 
celestial bodies. 
Under the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, both government and private 
entities are prohibited from claiming ownership over celestial bodies. 
Article II of the agreement explicitly states that, “Outer space, 
including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national 
appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, 
or by any other means.”59 
While this statement seems reasonable for preventing a government 
from, say, claiming the moon, it makes no distinction between the 
moon and asteroids, planets, meteorites, comets, or other celestial 
bodies. By preventing the ownership of celestial bodies, even those that 
have no utility beyond the resources they contain, the treaty effectively 
 
54 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 46. Since the Outer Space Treaty was ratified, 
several new countries have developed space programs. The reactions of those countries to 
the treaty are not discussed in this paper, as the development of space programs in new 
countries that did not ratify the treaty only reinforces the premise that the treaty is outdated 
legislation that needs to be revisited by the international community. 
55 Id. part 1(A) art. IV. 
56 Id. part 1(A) art. V. 
57 Id. part 1(A) art. VII. 
58 Id. part 1(A) art. IX. 
59 Id. part 1(A) art. II. 
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destroys the financial gain that could motivate corporations to explore 
and develop space. 
B. The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon 
and Other Celestial Bodies (1979) Also Fails to Recognize the Need 
to Provide Ownership Rights in Celestial Bodies 
The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and 
Other Celestial Bodies of 1979 (The Moon Treaty) also fails to create 
property rights in celestial bodies in a way that would incentivize space 
travel.60 Widely considered a failure, the Moon Treaty was an attempt 
to reform the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, but it was not ratified by any 
nation that had successfully launched a shuttle into space. 
The Moon Treaty took an idealistic approach to international space 
law, and if it were more effective it would have established an 
international regime to carry out its goals.61 The stated goals of the 
regime were to develop the natural resources of the moon and other 
celestial bodies, rationally manage those resources, and expand 
opportunities for parties to use and share the resources.62 
While the creation of said regime never occurred, it is clear the 
drafters of the Moon Treaty clearly foresaw the need for international 
agreement regarding space resources. Among other things, the Moon 
Treaty prohibits state parties from developing a military presence on 
the moon or any other celestial body,63 or excluding other state parties 
from scientific investigation in space.64 The Moon Treaty also attempts 
to require that any scientific discoveries useful to mankind be shared 
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations as well as the public 
and the international scientific community.65 Unlike the Outer Space 
Treaty of 1967, the Moon Treaty calls for the U.N. to maintain control 
over space, and has numerous provisions that call for approval by the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations before a state party can act. 
The Moon Treaty was an attempt to rationally manage space 
resources by creating an international regime to oversee space 
development. It fell short, however, by failing to grant substantive 
commercial rights that would incentivize space travel, making no 
 
60 See Moon Treaty, supra note 46. 
61 Id. art. 11 ¶  5. 
62 Id. art. 11 ¶ 7 (A–D). 
63 Id. art. 3 ¶ 1. 
64 Id. art 6. 
65 Id. art. 5 ¶ 1. 
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distinction between planets, comets, asteroids, or space debris with 
respect to its provisions (like the Outer Space Treaty), and by applying 
its provisions exclusively to state parties with few references to private 
action.66 
Article 11, paragraph 2 of The Moon Treaty states that “[t]he moon 
is not subject to national appropriation by any claim of sovereignty, by 
means of use or occupation, or by any means.”67 Thus, under the Moon 
Treaty, no entity can lay claim of ownership upon anything in space, 
regardless of the purpose of the claim. The agreement goes further to 
say explicitly that the surface, subsurface, and the natural resources in 
place on the moon will not become property of any state; international 
intergovernmental or nongovernmental organization; national 
organization or nongovernmental entity; or of any natural person.68 Put 
differently, the Moon Treaty explicitly prohibits both private and 
government actors from making commercial claims over the moon, and 
since the treaty is meant to apply to any celestial body within the solar 
system,  it follows that the same rule applies to space resources like 
those found on asteroids. While protecting space resources for science 
is certainly a laudable goal, the Moon Treaty prevents commercial 
claims in space, effectively stonewalling space’s development. One can 
hardly imagine a corporation spending the tremendous amount of 
money necessary to launch a space mission if the only payoff would be 
the chance to do research that would ultimately have to be shared with 
the public, including the corporation’s competitors. 
Like the Outer Space Treaty of 1968, the shortcomings of the Moon 
Treaty demonstrate the need for new international legislation regarding 
the right to own and use space resources like asteroids. The exploration 
and development of space could be incentivized and facilitated by a 
new international treaty that affords property rights to private and 
government entities in asteroids. The doctrine of appropriation would 
be a logical governing rule. 
  
 
66 Id. 
67 Id. art. 11 ¶ 2. 
68 Id. art. 11 ¶ 3. 
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III 
THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF APPROPRIATION TO 
ASTEROID MINING WOULD INCENTIVIZE CORPORATE SPACE 
EXPLORATION WHILE PREVENTING WASTE AND ABSTRACT 
CLAIMS 
Like water during the expansion of the American West, the 
exploration of space can be financed and incentivized by granting 
rights in resources to those who secure new resources and put them to 
beneficial use. Some legal scholars have suggested the traditional rule 
of capture be applied to asteroids,69 or that rights to asteroids be 
purchased directly from an international agency and owned as chattel.70 
However, like water during America’s westward expansion, asteroids 
are not easily classified under traditional property regimes. Thus, a 
doctrine of appropriation would be more appropriate for asteroids than 
a traditional rule of capture or a chattel system, because a system based 
on the traditional rule of capture or chattel would result in waste, 
abstract claims, and complicated legal issues. 
First, asteroid claims cannot be adjudicated under the traditional rule 
of capture, or as chattel, because such systems would be incredibly 
wasteful. As of now, scientists have observed approximately 450,000 
asteroids in our solar system.71  
But only a fraction of the observable bodies will be cost effective to 
mine. While it might one day be possible for a single entity to finance 
several mining missions at once, current costs associated with such a 
venture would limit almost any space-mining program to one or two 
asteroids, at least initially.72 The traditional rule of capture could allow 
an entity to quickly claim multiple asteroids merely by landing on them 
and planting a flag, without requiring the entity to show it can 
reasonably use the resources they have claimed. 
Even worse would be a system where the same corporation could 
claim asteroids simply by discovering their existence and registering 
the claim. Allowing this type of unregulated claim would incentivize 
larger corporations capable of space travel to quickly claim reachable 
asteroids, but the claims could easily outpace those entities’ realistic 
 
69 See Matthew Feinman, Mining the Final Frontier: Keeping Earth’s Asteroid Mining 
Ventures from Becoming the Next Gold Rush, 14 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 202 (2014). 
70 See Andrew Tingkang, These Aren’t the Asteroids You Are Looking For: Classifying 
Asteroids in Space as Chattels, Not Land, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 559 (2012). 
71 See generally Planetary Resources, supra note 40. 
72 Id. 
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expectations on what they could use. Under a traditional rule of capture 
system, the solar system could be divvied up long before the resources 
could conceivably be mined. A rule similar to the doctrine of 
appropriation used for water claims in the United States would alleviate 
this concern by limiting claims to those where a claimant can show a 
reasonable beneficial use for the resource. 
Another concern posed by the traditional rule of capture or chattel 
system would be the creation of abstract claims. Some legal scholars 
have advocated for a system where asteroids would be categorized as 
chattel, and rights in asteroids would be granted to an entity that could 
identify an asteroid and register ownership of it with an international 
agency.73 The advantage of such a system would be that it would allow 
an international agency to keep track of asteroids, and it would allow 
for the mapping of the reachable solar system. The problem with this 
approach, however, is that it would result in abstract claims. If an entity 
could claim the rights to an asteroid without actual possession, there is 
nothing to prevent that company from claiming ownership long in 
advance of any real possibility of landing on it. One of the reasons for 
creating the doctrine of appropriation was to limit abstract claims over 
resources that were not being used in any reasonable way. Just as the 
plaintiffs in Hague had no recourse against the third party who wasted 
the natural gas reserve, there would be no cause of action against an 
entity that has the rights to an asteroid, but chooses not to exercise 
them.74 This may be particularly harmful to society because asteroids 
contain volatiles that may be essential to creating rocket fuel in space, 
which, in turn, may be crucial to deep space exploration. 
Using asteroid-bound volatiles to make rocket fuel would reduce the 
cost and increase the range of space exploratory missions, possibly 
improving the human race’s ability to explore and develop space. 
Under a system were entities could claim asteroids without actual 
possession, those entities could exclude others from landing on the 
asteroids and using such resources, even when such resources are 
languishing unused in space. To prevent the creation of such abstract 
claims over asteroids, the doctrine of appropriation could be modified 
as to only grant rights only to entities who are able to demonstrate both 
actual possession and beneficial use. This would ensure that asteroids 
 
73 See Tingkang, supra note 70. 
74 See Hague v. Wheeler, 27 A. 714 (Pa. 1893). 
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claims are limited to those where the resources are actually being used, 
thus, maximizing the utility of such celestial bodies to society. 
Finally, asteroids cannot be adjudicated under the traditional rule of 
capture or a chattel system because their unique propensity to collide 
with other celestial bodies would result in vexing legal issues. Pop 
culture has popularized the notion of an asteroid crashing into the 
surface of Earth in movies and books, but interspace collisions may be 
a real concern. Asteroids are constantly moving through space, and 
they often crash into other asteroids or space debris, and sometimes 
onto the surface of planets. So real is the concern that space agencies 
regularly keep track of NEOs, or Near Earth Objects, which include 
around 10,000 asteroids large enough to be tracked in space.75 Imagine 
the scenario in the popular movie Armageddon, where society wrestles 
with the mechanics of destroying a huge asteroid that is headed straight 
for Earth.76 It would be strange, indeed, if the situation were further 
complicated by an entity owning the asteroid. Would the Earth have to 
compensate the company for the loss of resources, or would the 
company be forced to assume liability for the damage caused by the 
collision? What if the asteroid, rather than crashing into Earth, crashed 
instead into another asteroid owned by different entity? It makes sense 
that a company with actual possession of an asteroid should have a 
claim for actual mining equipment destroyed, but it seems 
unreasonable to treat the entire rock as the entity’s chattel. By limiting 
asteroid claims under a doctrine of appropriation-like system, society 
will be saved the headache of attempting to adjudicate such absurd 
situations. 
Because the traditional rule of capture or a chattel system for the 
ownership of asteroids would result in waste, abstract claims, and 
absurd legal dilemmas, a modified doctrine of appropriation should 
replace existing outdated international space law relating to asteroids. 
CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of appropriation is a reasonable rule for adjudicating 
asteroid claims, and it could easily be modified to apply to asteroid 
mining. In the context of water rights, the doctrine of appropriation 
requires that the claimant be a landowner in order to claim the right to 
use a water source. It does not make sense, however, for the 
 
75 See generally Near Earth Object Program, NASA, http://neo.jpl.nasa.gov/ca/ (last 
visited Mar. 20, 2015). 
76 ARMAGEDDON (Touchstone Pictures 1998). 
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international community to grant complete ownership over asteroids to 
a single entity, so the landowner requirement of the rule should be 
removed. A similar modification would need to be made to the 
“beneficial use” language of the doctrine. 
In the context of water rights, an appropriator obtains rights only to 
water that he or she can reasonably put to beneficial use. The metals 
contained in asteroids have a high level of marketability. For that 
reason, a mining entity could potentially put any amount of obtained 
metal to beneficial use, in the sense that the resources can be sold. This, 
however, would defeat the purpose of the rule, which is to limit such 
unreasonable claims. To ameliorate this problem, the doctrine of 
appropriation could be modified to define “beneficial use” 
constructively by providing that beneficial use is assumed for any 
resources that have been removed from the asteroid that the mining 
entity can reasonably hope to transport to market in a return journey. 
With the astronomical cost of undertaking a trip to such an asteroid, 
this modification would limit mining entities to only what they can 
carry back, thereby leaving the untapped resources available to other 
entities capable of making the same trip. Considering the size and 
profitability of metal deposits on asteroids, this modification to the 
doctrine of appropriation would not be overly burdensome to corporate 
interests. At the same time, it would satisfy the economic imperative of 
promoting the rapid development of asteroid resources. 
By changing the landowner requirement, and qualifying the 
“beneficial use” language, the doctrine of appropriation would be 
essentially ready for application to asteroid mining claims. The only 
other changes necessary would be some additional requirements that 
are common to other space related provisions, like those found in the 
Outer Space Treaty of 1968. For example, a reporting requirement or a 
clause guaranteeing asylum for other astronauts. A functional rule 
might read something like this: 
State parties or private entities may, upon actual possession, lay 
claim to natural resources found on or below the surface of asteroids. 
Rights to appropriate are given in order of seniority, starting with the 
first party to land on the surface of the asteroid and establish control 
over the resources, be it water, methane, metal, or any other beneficial 
substance. A party will be said to have established control over a 
resource once he has mined the substance and removed it from the 
asteroid. A senior appropriator may use as much of the asteroid’s 
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resources as he can take from the asteroid and put to beneficial use, 
and may continue to enlarge his share until another junior 
appropriator begins to appropriate resources from source for 
beneficial use. For the purposes of this Agreement, “beneficial use” 
refers to the amount of resources that an appropriator has removed 
from the asteroid that the actor may reasonably hope to bring home in 
a return voyage. Resources in excess of what an appropriator can 
reasonably hope to transport to market in a single voyage do not 
qualify as having a beneficial use, and are therefore not yet claimed. 
This means that the extraction of metal from an asteroid does not serve 
to provide ownership if the appropriator plans on letting the resources 
languish until another voyage is undertaken to secure the resources 
and bring them back to Earth. Junior appropriators receive rights in 
the source of resources (the asteroid) as they find it, and may prevent 
the senior appropriator from enlarging his share to the junior 
appropriator’s detriment under a no-injury rule. No state party will 
attempt to hinder other parties from landing on or using the asteroid, 
and parties will assist other entities on an asteroid, should they need 
emergency assistance. Mining claims on asteroids will be reported to 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and state parties agree to 
release the location of the asteroid, and any scientific findings to the 
United Nations, the general public, and the scientific community. In the 
event that the asteroid is on a collision course with any other celestial 
body, all state parties agree to follow the course of action suggested by 
the United Nations. Should the United Nations decide the asteroid must 
be destroyed, no state party may claim liability for resources contained 
within the asteroid, but not yet captured. This provision applies only to 
asteroids as classified by the scientific community, and does not apply 
to planets, comets, meteorites, or any other celestial body not 
mentioned. 
There is no doubt that asteroids may be extremely beneficial to 
mankind, both as a source of resources and as a jumping-off point to 
far off locations in space. The human-race has progressed scientifically 
and technologically to the point that space travel is within commercial 
reach, and the need for new international laws governing the ownership 
of space has never been more apparent. The Outer Space Treaty of 1968 
made great strides in developing rational rules for space and many of 
its provisions should be maintained in their original form. However, by 
allowing ownership of asteroids under the doctrine of appropriation, 
the international community can incentivize the exploration and 
development of space in a way that reflects the needs of society in 
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general, without vesting an absolute monopoly in a single entity. The 
doctrine of appropriation helped drive American westward expansion, 
and its application to space mining would help drive the human race in 
its expansion into the space, the final frontier. 
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